The ability for terrorists and/or states to acquire or make nuclear weapons has grown dangerously high, due in part to the poor state of security surrounding nuclear weapons and nuclear material around the world ("loose nukes").

1. Immediately sign a treaty of non-aggression with North Korea;
2. Immediately enter bilateral talks with North Korea;
3. Pay in full for all removal, remediation and transfer activities;
4. Construct at the cost of the United States a state-of-the-art, non-nuclear power generation facility of capacity equal to the full capacity of the facility decommissioned;
5. Supply fuel for such facility for a period of 5 years;
6. Assist to the fullest extent of the United States' ability in providing gainful alternative employment for North Korea's nuclear scientists;
7. Provide food aid with a fair market value of $1 billion annually for a period of 5 years.

4.  The United States will adopt the following protocols with respect to states with nuclear weapons ("nuclear weapons states"):

1. Increase disbursements of funds for the Defense Department's Cooperative Threat Reduction Program ("Nunn-Lugar") -- efforts to secure "loose" nuclear weapons, materials, and facilities in the former Soviet Union -- to a level that will permit completion of the program's goals within one year, with the anticipation that such funding would range from $15 - $20 billion.
2. Dramatically expand plutonium disposal programs either through immobilization or a mechanism that would render the plutonium "Proliferation Resistant" (see Section 5.A below).  Encourage other countries to follow suit.
3. C. Establish an international accord between nuclear weapon states and countries with large stockpiles of nuclear materials to secure all nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and nuclear weapons sites to accepted minimal safe levels within one-and-a-half years.   Minimal safe level is defined as the ability for nuclear power facilities to be able to withstand a well-coordinated, well-funded terrorist attack -- equivalent to infiltration or penetration attempts by a military special forces squad-level team armed with light weapons, non-military vehicles, and access to publicly available documents.  The U.S.  shall contribute $1 billion to other countries (e.g., Pakistan, India, etc.) to accomplish this.

5.  The United States will adopt the following protocols with respect to commercial nuclear power facilities:

1. Immediately create and publish a series of detailed protocols that scientifically identify which fuel types, and under which circumstances, are deemed "Proliferation Resistant," that is, the fuel is (i) not readily converted to weapons use either due to its chemical characteristics (enrichment status), (ii) is blended with non-weapons grade materials and not readily separable, and/or (iii) is so highly toxic that it cannot be transported.  Currently only low-enriched uranium meets these criteria.  Other fuels may be developed which may be Proliferation Resistant as technology advances.
2. Within one year shut down or repurpose fuel reprocessing facilities and plutonium fuel programs that do not meet the Proliferation Resistant standards described in Section 5.A above.
3. Prohibit the export of highly-enriched uranium and plutonium and any other non-Proliferation Resistant material, such as mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel.
4. Increase the mandatory security requirements to minimal safe levels as defined in Section 4.C above.  Failure to meet security requirements within one year, as judged by an independent authority, will result in immediate plant shutdown and removal of nuclear material to a secure government location until the security requirements are met.
5. E. Any new nuclear reactor to be constructed must (i) use only low-enriched uranium, or nuclear fuels that can be shown to be equivalently Proliferation Resistant to low-enrichment uranium and (ii) be immediately compliant with security requirements at the time nuclear materials become present on site.

1. Seek the shut down or repurposing of any enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing, nuclear power, and plutonium fuel facilities whose materials or fuel do not meet Proliferation Resistant standards through the use of a full range of economic and political measures to encourage.  Likewise, seek to outlaw the trade and transport of highly-enriched uranium and plutonium world-wide except for the purpose of permanent waste disposal.
2. Establish an international fuel bank.  The fuel bank shall:
   1. Be fully open to multi-national and international inspections
   2. Have secured facilities that fully meet the requirements described in Section 4.C above
   3. Produce only Proliferation Resistant fuel as defined in Section 5.A above
   4. Guarantee fuel to countries whose power plants use only Proliferation Resistant fuel
   Furthermore, the construction of any enrichment facilities outside of these fuel banks should be considered per se an act of international aggression.  
3. Deploy a full range of economic and political measures to encourage the adoption of security requirements of nuclear power facilities to be able to withstand a well-coordinated, well-funded terrorist attack, as per Section 4.C above.
4. Deploy a full range of economic and political measures to encourage that any new nuclear reactor to be constructed must (i) use only lightly-enriched uranium or equivalently Proliferation Resistant nuclear fuels, and (ii) be immediately compliant with security requirements at the time nuclear materials become present on site.   Such fuels should be obtainable from the international fuel bank described in Section 5.B above.
5. Seek conversion of all research reactors and nuclear power plants to the use of low-enriched uranium -- as is already the case in the United States.  To help encourage this, the United States government will reimburse affected institutions for their material losses and cancelled contracts due to such closures up to an additional $3 billion per country and not more than $20 billion in total, with funding distributed preferentially in order of compliance with this protocol.